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Particularly since the beginning of the new millennium, the Cyprus
issue that had hitherto been successfully securitized and bureau-
cratized has turned out to be the main ‘discursive battlefield’ of the
polarization among ruling elites in Turkey. Framed within a historical
perspective, the present article re-examines Turkey’s security dis-
course on Cyprus with particular reference to its implications for the
(re)configuration of political balances and power relations between
the conservative state elite – namely, the civilian and military bureau-
cracy – and the reformist political elite in Turkey. It concludes that 
the security language devised by the Turkish ‘foreign’ policy and
security establishment has been operational in both inscribing the
legitimate boundaries of the political sphere and crippling the
manoeuvring ability of governments vis-à-vis the strong bureaucratic
establishment in Turkey. The article also aims at encouraging the
reader to critically reflect on power politics of ‘foreign’ policymaking
in Turkey and its implications for domestic politics.
Keywords Cyprus • securitization • bureaucratization • foreign 
policymaking • Turkish military
FOR MANY IN TURKEY, the landing of Turkish troops on the smallMediterranean island of Cyprus in July and August 1974 amounts tothe last act of the play staged on that island. Nevertheless, in contrast
to such an ahistorical discourse, the implications of the Cyprus issue in 
contemporary Turkish domestic politics and ‘foreign’ policy are far more
complicated than they used to be in previous decades. Of particular interest
is its ever-increasing decisiveness and embeddedness within internal power
relations in contemporary Turkish politics. From the end of 2002 onward,
this embeddedness has reached such an extent that the Cyprus issue has
turned out to be the main ‘discursive battlefield’ of the polarization among
the conservative/statist and reformist ruling elites.
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Two imperative events can be cited as the reasons situating Cyprus at the
centre of political debate in Turkey: The first is the November 2002 general
elections in Turkey, which resulted in the overwhelming victory of the
Justice and Development Party (AKP), defending a more reformist and 
integrationist attitude towards the European Union vis-à-vis the parties
adopting a more nationalist, statist and Euro-sceptic line. The second is 
the establishment of an explicit linkage between the fate of Turkey’s EU per-
spective and finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. However, instead 
of focusing on these, this study aims at addressing the official security 
discourse on Cyprus with particular reference to its implications for the
(re)configuration of political balances and power relations between the 
state elite, namely the civilian and military bureaucracy, and the reformist
political elite in Turkey.
Inspired by the post-structuralist account of ‘foreign’ policy as a ‘boundary
producing and disciplinary practice’ (Campbell, 1998: 62) and the securitiza-
tion approach of the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998),
the main concern of this article is to introduce a power perspective into 
the analyses of the Cyprus question. As a matter of fact, getting a better
insight into Turkey’s security discourse on Cyprus necessitates reflecting 
on the actors and the relations between them that are influential in the 
formulation and transmission of that discourse. The article departs from the
assumption that the main reason for the centrality of the Cyprus issue 
within domestic power relations in Turkey stems from its heavy – ‘exces-
sive’, in Buzan’s (1997: 21) terms – securitization by the ‘foreign’ policy and
security establishment. Here, the term ‘securitization’ refers not primarily to
militarization but rather to depoliticization within a technocratic and
authoritarian discursive economy (see Wæver, 1998a: 46–86; Buzan, Wæver
& de Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1998b: 69–118). Premised on this conceptualiza-
tion, the present contribution outlines the crucial implications of Turkey’s
security discourse on Cyprus for internal power structures as follows: First,
the casting of the Cyprus issue as one of national security has severely con-
strained the power and capacity of the political elite to intervene in the 
substance of existing policies. It has forced the government as the political
authority to pursue predetermined policies by remaining loyal to the ‘red
lines’ drawn up by the ‘foreign’ policy and security establishment. 
Second, the consistent efforts of the bureaucratic elite to hold the Cyprus
question within the sphere of ‘the existential’ and ‘the imminent’ thwarted
the occurrence of widespread social debate within an autonomous public
sphere, and thus led to the depoliticization and fixation of the issue as an
area of bureaucratic specialty and competence. Third, the effective insulation
of ‘foreign’ policy issues in general, and the Cyprus case in particular, 
from public debate and the political domain has reinforced the power 
and hegemonic status of the bureaucratic apparatus, who ‘consider them-
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selves as the ideological guardian of the “state”’ (Yeldan & Cizre, 2002: 17).
Against this background, problematizing the official state line on Cyprus is
also of great merit, for it permits an unravelling of the intimate relationality
between securitization and bureaucratization – which is not adequately
developed by the Copenhagen School. However, decoding this relationship
is such an exhaustive task that it will require another article dedicated 
solely to that aim. The current work, often implicitly indicating some basic
features of the relationship, can only stand for a bold and provocative step in
further research into the topic. Suffice it to state at this point that the securi-
tization of crucial ‘foreign’ policy issues – in this case, the Cyprus question –
imposes a definite conception of a political order in Turkey, an order in
which the pro-status quo bureaucratic establishment can sustain its privi-
leged position particularly vis-à-vis the reform-seeking wing of the political
elite.1 On the other hand, moving the issues out of party politics by pre-
suming that they are entangled within an area of bureaucratic competence
both imperils questioning the state’s securitized practices and serves to 
marginalize alternative discourses, which may eventually lead to the securi-
tization of issues. Hence, securitization and bureaucratization may be con-
sidered as processes simultaneously triggering one another and ultimately
leading to depoliticization, the antidote to which is desecuritizing the issues
at hand.
To comprehend better the conventional Turkish rhetoric on Cyprus, I will
first revisit the Copenhagen School by highlighting its analyses on securiti-
zation as an ‘intersubjective’ and ‘conscious’ political act. The objective of 
the following section is to discuss and demonstrate the main themes of the
official security language on the Cyprus question. Official declarations and
statements extracted from different historical epochs of the dispute will be
examined to shed light on this securitizing practice. In the subsequent part,
by drawing on Metin Heper’s distinction between the state elite and the
political elite in Turkey, the article addresses the role and impact of ‘foreign’
policy on domestic power/domination relations as a securitized and politi-
cally sacrosanct discursive space. In the concluding section, I will briefly
touch upon some recent signs pointing to the erosion of the conventional
approach to ‘foreign’ policy, which embraces the real potential of strength-
ening the hand of the reformist political elite and civil society.
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1 I should immediately state at this point that neither the bureaucratic nor the political elites can be presumed
to be monolithic, homogeneous groups, for it is possible to speak of seminal cleavages among the public
bureaucracy and the political elites, both comprising proponents of a more statist and nationalistic 
paradigm of politics or of political liberalism. Nevertheless, this does not prevent one from specifying the
strong proclivities and dominant patterns of behaviour observable in the bureaucratic and political elites.
Securitization as an Intersubjective and 
Explicit Political Act
Turkey has a multitude of soft and hard security concerns. Owing to 
historic, cultural, economic and strategic linkages, and the location of
Turkey at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, as well as the Mediterranean
and Black Sea Basins, these concerns are increasingly interconnected with
security in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian region, the Persian Gulf
and the Middle East. The most pressing concern for Turkey, however, is the
bundle of disagreements with Greece. The Cyprus question is the knot that
binds the bundle. (Olgun, 1999: 231–232)
The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is not a threat to
a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility. (Campbell,
1998: 12–13)
From the 1990s on, the field of critical security studies has led to a theoreti-
cal revival within the discipline of International Relations as ‘the primary
forum in which broadly social constructivist approaches have challenged
traditional – largely Realist and neorealist – theories on their “home turf”’
(Williams, 2003: 511). Of these new critical positions, the securitization
approach of the Copenhagen School has triggered the most vibrant debates.
Despite some of its limitations,2 the Copenhagen School has managed to 
successfully introduce a power perspective to security studies, a power 
perspective through which the securitizing acts of domestic actors can be
reappraised within the context of internal power/domination relations. As
Johan Eriksson (1999: 315) has correctly argued, in the Copenhagen School
securitization ‘is seen as being about the power politics of a concept’.
Traditional realist paradigms presume the established definition of 
national security as an objective reality without attributing to it any norma-
tive and political implications as to domestic politics. In sharp contrast, for
the Copenhagen School and other critical approaches to security inspired by
the post-structuralist account of ‘foreign’ policy, there cannot exist objective
threats (Campbell, 1998: 1–12), but ‘only attempts to saddle issues with
“security” implications. Thus, anyone who classifies an issue as a “security
problem” makes a political . . . decision’ (Eriksson, 1999: 315). For Wæver,
every attempt to securitize an issue is an explicit, political choice and an act
with seminal consequences ‘for which actors can be held responsible’
(Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 212). Securitization as a conscious political
choice of the ruling elite ‘marks a decision, a “breaking free of rules” and the
suspension of normal politics’ (Williams, 2003: 518). It follows from the
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2 For criticisms of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, see Bigo (2002); Aradau (2001);
McSweeney (1996: 81–93); Eriksson (1999: 311–333); Williams (2003: 511–531); for a criticism of Buzan’s
(1991) state-centrism, see Bilgin (2002: 100–118).
above analysis that security is a self-referential practice precisely because ‘it
is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue’ (Buzan, Wæver &
de Wilde, 1998: 24). In this sense, securitization can be treated as a ‘disciplin-
ary practice’ and/or mechanism whereby issues are born into the field of the
existential, the vital and the imminent. 
This is where the particularly paradoxical nature of securitization can be
revealed with the help of the Copenhagen School. Even though the basic
motivation behind the act of securitization is to remove issues from the
sphere of normal politics and to isolate them from public debate, the act itself
is essentially a political intervention vulnerable to the claims of subjectivity
and illegitimacy. This paradox and vulnerability, inherent in the nature of
securitization, can be clarified by means of highlighting its three characteris-
tics: First, securitization necessitates the use and perpetual repetition of a
specific ‘rhetoric of existential threat’, through which issues are dramatized
as issues of ‘supreme priority’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 24, 26) by
the securitizing actor, which is all too often the government and/or bureau-
cratic establishments. Through the articulation of danger and existential
threat to sovereignty, the securitizer demands justification from the audience
(read society) for its initiatives, which are not otherwise legitimate. By
declaring a specific threat to be a challenge to sovereignty, the securitizer
also implies that all necessary means will be used to block that challenge
(Wæver, 1998a: 56).
At this point, by making a new theoretical move, Ole Wæver and his 
colleagues reveal the second characteristic of securitization, which is inter-
subjectivity, rendering it a teleologically political process. Despite the fact
that securitization is realized through subjective threat perceptions and 
calculations articulated by the securitizer, the word ‘subjective’ falls short of
defining the process of securitization on the grounds that ‘whether an issue
is a security issue is not something individuals [read securitizer] decide
alone’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 31). The success of any attempt to
securitize an issue is contingent upon the existence of an audience that
accepts and tolerates acts by the securitizer that are not otherwise legitimate
(Wæver, 2000: 251). Nevertheless, Buzan and Wæver do not unequivocally
explain whether an explicit endorsement by an audience is necessary for the
presumption that the conditions for such an acceptation have fully occurred.
Even if they concede that the securitizing move is realized through either
coercion or consent and is achieved through negotiations between the 
securitizer [read ruling elite] and the audience/society, they are not clear
regarding the nature of the negotiation processes through which such
approval for securitization is acquired. For instance, they do not discuss the
role attributed to imposition, political manipulation through the media and
other instruments,3 and the legal sanctions and restrictions applied by the
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3 For the importance of televisual communication within the process of securitization, see Williams (2003). 
securitizing agent to obtain such an acceptance. As in the case of Cyprus,
issues may successfully be securitized through various legal and political
mechanisms, ensuring the silence of the obedient. Therefore, approval is 
not necessarily preceded by a process of free discussion but, in some 
cases, can be identified with the absence of an explicit opposition to the 
securitizing move.
Third, the identity of the securitizer situates the securitization process
undoubtedly in the centre of the political. To Wæver (1998a: 57), ‘security is
articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’. As
such, securitization as a speech act, a discursive and performative process, is
utilized as a technique of governance, since by ‘naming a certain development
a security problem, the “state” can claim a special right, one that will, in the final
instance, always be defined by the state and its elites’ (Wæver, 1998a: 54).
This paves the way for the instrumentalization of security by ‘power 
holders’ for their ‘specific, self-serving purposes’. As one of several required
but not sufficient ‘felicity conditions’, Wæver maintains that the speaker 
of security should have a ‘social capital’ and ‘has to be in a position of
authority’ (Wæver, 2000: 252–253). What should be added to this analysis 
is the fact that security may also be utilized as a reproducer of this social 
capital. To illustrate, specifically the military wing of the Turkish state elite
has customarily utilized its credibility in the eyes of the domestic society in
declaring what the internal and external threats to the nation and state are.
The provocative security lexicon it has used has also been functional in 
conveying the message to the society that ‘notwithstanding unreliable, self-
serving and even corrupt politicians, we are on duty, ready and alert’.
Considering the above, one may come to the conclusion that securitization
as an intersubjective and explicit political act cannot be thought to be outside
domestic power/domination relations within a given polity. For instance, in
Turkey, where the domestic order was eclipsed by politics of security during
the 1980s and the 1990s, the authoritarian nature of state–society relations
during this period cannot fully be captured without examining the securitiz-
ing practices of the ruling elite. In this sense, my subsequent tasks will be,
first, to discuss and exemplify the main tracks of Turkey’s official security
lexicon on Cyprus, and, second, to focus on its implications within domestic
politics.
The Securitizing Official Discourse on the Cyprus
Question and the Centrality of Geopolitics
The ‘foreign’ policy and security establishment in Turkey has always placed
special emphasis on the geostrategically vital status of Cyprus for the 
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country’s defence and security. Mainly owing to the centrality of geopolitics,
‘the “strategic element” has continued to be of the utmost importance in
Turkish calculations’ (Kazan, 2002: 58) since the existence of the Cyprus
problem was formally recognized in Turkey in the middle of the 1950s. In the
rhetoric of the ‘foreign’ policy and security establishment, the Cyprus issue,
involving ‘Turkey’s vital national and strategic interests’ (Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Kazan, 2002: 57) has Janus-faced implications in
Turkey’s strategic calculations and threat perceptions: the geographical
proximity of the island to the Anatolian heartland is made use of to represent
the issue in domestic politics either as a source of imminent, fatal and per-
sistent threat to the Turkish nation and state or as an indispensable element
and integral part of Turkey’s national defence and security. 
Cyprus as a Source of Existential Threat and the Fear of Encirclement 
While depicting how Cyprus constitutes an urgent and persistent threat 
to Turkey’s rights and existence, the discourse of encirclement has been
recurrently referred to within the official and mainstream argumentation.
‘Stuck in its southern underbelly, Cyprus is a major source of concern for
Turkey’, and ‘it is the final, southern element in the containment of Turkey’
(Olgun, 1999: 232). The island, which has a ‘strategic position to control the
important Turkish harbours of Iskenderun and Mersin’, can easily be 
utilized by a hostile power as a ‘springboard for the conquest of Anatolia
from the South’ (see Kazan, 2002: 58). This argument is based on the 
presumption that ‘an unfriendly power lodged in Cyprus could easily strike
the nation’s Anatolian heartland’ (I
.
smail, 1989: 137). From the military and
strategic perspective, any state dominant on the island would have a say in
‘the fate of Turkey’, since ‘if this dominant power is also the same dominant
power on the islands to the west [of Turkey], Turkey would be de facto 
encircled’ (former Turkish prime minister F. Rüstü Zorlu, quoted in Kazan,
2002: 58). Encapsulated in all these excerpts is the idea that the real threat is
Greece itself. This is the reason why the discourse and fear of encirclement
locates the Cyprus issue directly into the field of ‘vitality’ and ‘emergency’. 
Turkey’s Aegean coast is blockaded because of the possession of the
Dodeconese Islands by Greece. As a matter of fact Turkey’s only free access
to the sea is its southern shores. About 40 miles away from these shores is
the island of Cyprus. Possession of Cyprus by Greece through Enosis,
would have meant the encirclement of the southern shores of Turkey as
well. Therefore Turkey had to destroy the de facto situation created by the
coup of 15 July with the military intervention of 20 July. (I
.
smail, 1989: 171)
Throughout the 1990s, during which the parameters of security and being
secure dramatically altered at the global scale, ascendancy of the discourse of
encirclement remained intact in Turkey’s official outlook on Cyprus. Cyprus
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continued to be imagined as ‘the cornerstone of Greece’s policy of envelop-
ing Turkey with a strategic belt of hostile states’ (Olgun, 1999: 231–232). For
instance, the signing of military and technical cooperation agreements
between Armenia and the Greek-controlled sector of Cyprus has been inter-
preted by both Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot ‘foreign’ policy and security
establishments as ‘an attempt at the encirclement of Turkey and the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus by the hostile forces’ (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Defence of the TRNC, 2002). In the same vein, remarks by the
chief of the Turkish General Staff Hilmi Özkök in January 2003 regarding
recent developments in Cyprus in the light of UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan’s peace plan are stunningly revealing. According to the leader of 
the Turkish military, in the event of acceptance of Annan’s proposals ‘the
entrapment of Turkey in Anatolia’ (Güven, 2003; Tasgetiren, 2003; Kathi-
merini, 2003) would have been completed. This rather fervent rhetoric 
qualifying Annan’s plan as a threat to Turkey’s security stands out as a 
perfect illustration of the securitization of an issue that is political in nature.4
Cyprus as an Indispensable Element of Turkey’s National Security
Even though the discourse on the ‘undeniable’ and ‘fragile’ rights of the
Turkish-Cypriot minority occasionally gained ascendancy, especially in the
1960s and 1970s, the language encoding the Cyprus question primarily as an
issue of national security has proved its durability and dominance until
recent years. The second component of this ‘security speak’ hinges upon the
notion that Cyprus is an inexorable and integral part of Turkey’s national
defence and security. The following statement by Turan Günes, Turkey’s 
foreign minister in the left-leaning Ecevit cabinet during Turkey’s military
intervention of July–August 1974 in Cyprus, reveals how the Turkish state
elite understands and expresses the nature of the Cyprus question:
Cyprus is as precious as the right arm of a country which cares for
her defence or her expansionistic aims if she harbours any. If we don’t 
keep this strategic importance of Cyprus we cannot understand the
peace operation of 20 July [1974] or rather it is impossible to understand the
entire Cyprus crisis. . . . Many states, to a certain extent because it suits
their interest, want to see the Cyprus problem merely as our desire to 
protect the Turkish community on the island. Whereas the actual problem
is the security of 45 million Turks in the motherland together with the
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softened by January 2004. In a statement issued by the National Security Council after its meeting on 23
January 2004, it was declared that ‘Turkey continues to support the U.N. secretary-general’s goodwill
mission and has renewed its political determination to rapidly reach a solution that takes the Annan plan
as a reference’ (Turkish Daily News, 2004b). However, it is difficult to say that this new position is shared
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Turks in the island and the maintenance of the balance of the Middle East.
(Hürriyet, 1980)
The notion that Cyprus is geographically a part and natural extension of
Anatolian heartland, and thus an integral part of its defence and security, has
been articulated by many prominent Turkish bureaucratic and political 
figures throughout the long history of the dispute. In the words of former
Turkish prime minister Adnan Menderes, ‘Cyprus is but the continuation of
Anatolia and constitutes one of the pivotal elements as regards its security’
(quoted in Armaog lu, 1963: 133). The approach equating the security of the
Turkish state with that of the TRNC is illustrated in remarks by another 
former Turkish prime minister, Bülent Ecevit: ‘we now believe that not only
is Turkey guarantor of the security of the TRNC, but at the same time we
consider the existence of the TRNC to be a necessity for the security of
Turkey’ (Kazan, 2002: 61). In a joint declaration between Turkey and the
TRNC, ‘both sides have emphasized the increasing importance of the TRNC
for the security of Turkey, while Turkey continues to provide effective 
guarantee for the TRNC’ (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997). The
widely used metaphor of ‘motherland–babyland’ in Turkey’s official and
popular discourse also implies the inseparability and intertwinedness of the
security of the two. This metaphor serves to emphasize both indissoluble
and sacred linkages between Motherland Turkey and Babyland Cyprus and
the unity of their fate and destiny.
The quotations under the last two subheadings reveal that within Turkey’s
security language the Cyprus issue signifies two seemingly paradoxical con-
notations. On the one hand, it implies the existence of a vital and imminent
threat to Turkey’s national security. On the other, it is an integral part of
national defence, the absence of which would create a substantial hole in the
protection of Turkey’s territorial integrity. Even though these modes of 
representation seem paradoxical at first glance, they are complementary in
the sense that, in either case, the island refers to an ‘unsinkable aircraft 
carrier’ (Kazan, 2002: 58) bound to be used by a hostile power to strike the
Anatolian heartland, or that can be used by Turkey against that aggressive
state. Thereby, within this technical-sounding securitizing language imbued
with excessive geopoliticism, the island of Cyprus is simultaneously the 
cornerstone in the encirclement of Turkey and its only access to the Eastern
Mediterranean from the south. This geopoliticism, to which I will return in
the subsequent pages, sets out the intimate relationality between securitiza-
tion and bureaucratization by highlighting the indispensability of the island
as a geostrategic asset.
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‘Foreign’ Policy as a Secured Area of Bureaucracy: A
Brief Glance at Post-1980s Turkey
Even though the Cyprus issue is generally approached by most Turkish IR
scholars only within the context of the Turkish state’s external relations, it
has increasingly turned out to be an integral part of Turkey’s internal power
relations. To shed more light on this aspect, I will draw on Metin Heper’s
(1992) distinction between the state elite and the political elite in Turkey. To
Heper, throughout the period of Turkish modernization, ‘from the 19th 
century onward, the bureaucratic and/or military elites [read the state elite]
acted in the belief that they themselves were solely responsible for maintain-
ing order and modernizing their country’ (Heper, 1992: 176). These state
elites, perceiving themselves as the ‘ultimate guardian’ of the state, nurtured
deep mistrust and suspicion of the political elites, particularly if the 
latter claimed to represent peripheral social groups disenchanted with the
state’s project of radical modernization.5 When political groups remained
outside the centre and could not internalize the social and political norms
and values established by the state elite, this polarity and the conflicts
embedded in it grew exponentially. 
In the Republican era (beginning in 1923), the Kemalist state elite foresaw
that Turkish society would move en masse towards Westernization. This
modernizing cadre envisioned ‘an organized, well-articulated, linear process
of modernization’ (Kasaba, 1997: 16–17), the political, cultural and ethical
limits of which were inscribed solely by the state itself. However, particu-
larly from the middle of the 20th century onward, a new formation within
the political elite has reinvigorated against the bureaucratic and political
establishment. Unlike the latter, they foregrounded the priority of the 
national will vis-à-vis the exigencies of the raison d’état. Since then, almost 
all fields of political, economic and cultural life in Turkey have become dis-
cursive and performative battlefields for the polarity between the Kemalist
state elite and this fledgling political elite.
Throughout the more than 80 years’ history of the Turkish Republic, 
‘foreign’ policy has been the sphere where such polarization was kept at a
minimum level, if it occurred at all. Insofar as the political leaders whose 
statist Weltanschauung and reflexes were as strong as those of the bureau-
cratic establishment remained in power, an unreserved compromise con-
cerning how ‘foreign’ policy issues were to be governed lingered on. Even
seemingly reformist politicians avoided publicly questioning the democratic
legitimacy of the Republicanist tradition of ‘foreign’ policymaking, placing
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‘foreign’ policy beyond normal politics and public debate. More strikingly,
the military’s decisive role and impact on ‘foreign’ affairs has been tolerated,
and at times deemed necessary, both by governments and the public in
Turkey (Uzgel, 2004: 313). The Kemalist state elite conceived ‘foreign’ policy
and wanted others to conceive it as a vital sphere in pursuit of Turkey’s 
national interests and security goals. During the Cold War years, most 
political leaders, either willingly or because they avoided assuming the
responsibility for any deviancy from the politics of security, contributed to 
the reproduction of securitizing discourses in the field of ‘foreign’ affairs. In
most cases, ‘foreign’ political acts of the Turkish state have been presented
by the ruling elite as endeavours to ward off external threats directed against
the state’s unity and integrity. Thus, in the official rhetoric, as exemplified in
the Cyprus case, ‘foreign’ policy referred to a battlefield to be entrusted only
to those cognizant of its peculiar rules and techniques. 
Within this conceptualization, it was deemed futile and non-functional to
open up ‘foreign’ policy decisions and discourses of the state to the dis-
cussion of the ‘ignorant masses’, who were expected only to clamp around
the national policies. Similarly, the role and significance of various govern-
ments often remained marginal regarding ‘vital’ ‘foreign’ policy issues.
Governments had no alternative other than to pursue policies already 
formulated by the Turkish bureaucratic elite, especially if they were labelled
‘state policies’ and/or ‘national causes’ (Kaliber, 2003: 217–275). As aptly 
put by Philip Robins, the process of ‘foreign’ policymaking has not been
managed in Turkey in the way it has been done in full-fledged democracies:
In Turkey, the guidelines of grand strategy, of high politics belong not to
the government of the day as an expression of the popular will, but to the
highest priests of Kemalism, as an expression of the ideals of Atatürk. These
guardians of the sacred will consist first and foremost of the senior officer
corps of the military, supplemented at a secondary level by parts of the
bureaucracy, and the top diplomats in the case of the Foreign Ministry.
(Robins, 2003: 69)
This governmental rationality, in which governments do not govern, can be
certified by scrutinizing various statements made by Turkish political and
bureaucratic figures on the Cyprus issue. For example:
If an aggressive move directed against us through our community turns
into a dispute, we shall not hesitate for a moment to implement the prede-
termined elements of our policy on the subject. I am certainly not saying
this in the sense of a threat. This is the basis of our established policy fixed
for years as a Nation and State. Governments have changed, and may
change but policy of Turkey on Cyprus does not change. (Haluk Bayülken,
former Turkish minister of foreign affairs, quoted in Söylemez: 1973: 297)
According to this line of thought, echoed by another former Turkish minis-
ter of foreign affairs, F. R. Zorlu, ‘Turkish people cannot think differently
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about the future of an island which is existentially important to the defence
of its country’ (quoted in Kazan, 2002: 58). The official state line epitomized
in these words presumes an absolute unity and unproblematic identicalness
between the state and society, and also imagines the latter as a unified and
homogeneous totality.
This mindset, reflecting the consensus among the top political and bureau-
cratic figures until recent years, provokes questions about the effectiveness
and capacity of governments insofar as ‘foreign’ policy is concerned.
The contours of Turkish foreign policy are drawn, under the rubric of ‘state
policies’, by the ‘armed’ bureaucracy and its extensions in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. If there exist established ‘state policies’, what is the 
relevance then of changing the ruling government? (Altan, 2002)
The nature of the political system, in which governments are forced not to
transcend the ‘red zones’ of the ‘foreign’ policy and security establishment,
did not just severely restrict the capacities of governments to govern. It 
also gave the statist/nationalist political and bureaucratic establishment a
proper ground on which it could easily delegitimize opposition, since criti-
cizing these fixed policies amounted to criticizing the regime and the state
itself. More or less radical criticisms directed at the official state line tend 
to be evaluated as opposition to ‘the state’s indivisible identity with the
country and the nation’ (Bora, 2003: 438), especially if these are related to
issues associated with national security. As a result, the ‘foreign’ policy
choices and actions of a narrow state class have managed to remain exempt
from public debate and questioning until very recently.
Our case of Cyprus also underpins the point that, mainly owing to the 
confinement of issues within a technical security language, ‘the dominant
mode of political imagination becomes technical know-how and technocrats
become the substitute for politicians. This anti-political mind-set is par-
ticularly apparent with regard to the expansion of the autonomy of civil and 
military establishment’ (Yeldan & Cizre, 2002: 14–15). For instance, the 
indispensability of Cyprus for Turkey’s national defence and security is
often expressed through complex regional and global strategic calculations
and threat perceptions (Davutog lu, 2001: 175–180). Within this logic, the
geostrategically salient position of the island as an objective and unchanging
reality forces Turkey to pursue a definite policy of security that has to be
based on technical know-how, expertise and long-term strategies. A news
analysis that appeared on 5 March 2003 in the Turkish Daily News, reputed to
have close ties to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made for interest-
ing reading. According to the paper, ‘some military analysts’ maintained that
whatever the strategy the AK Party headquarters could produce, as was
laid down clearly at the latest Feb. 28 National Security Council (MGK)
meeting, Turkey must be ready for new possible tensions in the entire
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southern front from Cyprus to Iraq, and must act with the awareness that
every stone in that front is linked with each other. ‘We must know that the
loss of one playing piece may bring about a total defeat,’ a leading source
commented, stressing that a ‘retreat’ from the Cyprus position could land
Turkey in a position to ‘retreat’ in all fronts, including the EU. (Turkish Daily
News, 2003)
As Bilgin (2005: 186–187) puts it, ‘geographical determinism’ – also observ-
able in defining Turkey’s own geographical location and the ‘tough neigh-
bourhood’ in which it is located – ‘has been used to legitimize the adoption
of a particular concept of national security that does not allow for further
democratization’. It is mainly owing to this objectivist geopoliticism that an
inner link between securitization and bureaucratization is constituted and
kept alive via a technical and depoliticized security lexicon. According to a
widespread understanding within the Turkish military corps, in order for
the national ‘foreign’ and security policy to be successful it should be exempt
from the infertile discussions of daily political haggling and pressures from
social groups and political parties that may seek their own subjective 
interests (Özcan, 2002: 21). Undoubtedly, the widespread dissemination of
this technocratic security outlook throughout the 1990s recognized a con-
siderable space for the military to institutionalize its autonomy both in
domestic politics and ‘foreign’ policy. Throughout the period, Turkish poli-
tics witnessed the swift pervasiveness of the discourse and practices of the
Turkish state elite bearing almost all ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ issues into the
field of security and vitality. 
When the late 1990s arrived, the military emerged ‘more publicly than at
any time . . . as the most important institution, at least in charting the strate-
gic dimension of “foreign” policy’ (Robins, 2003: 92). This institutional
autonomy enjoyed in ‘foreign’ affairs has been instrumentalized by the
Turkish military in narrowing the boundaries of the domestic political space
in favour of security.
As the sole actor defining internal and external threats, the military, while
making use of its weight in domestic politics to have a say on foreign 
policy making, benefited from external threats to consolidate and further
increase its role and impact on domestic politics. Assuming itself as the
principal element of the Turkish state, the military has created itself an
autonomous realm besides already feeble civil society. (Uzgel, 2004: 312) 
This not only posed a major obstacle in the insertion of a wide range of politi-
cal issues into the public sphere, but also set the proper ground for the
National Security Council (NSC) to increase its power and authority in order
to intervene across the entire spectrum of socio-political and cultural life in
Turkey. In particular, immediately after the 1980 military coup, the NSC and
its secretariat have been the most sophisticated instruments for the military
top brass to consolidate their authority in shaping national ‘foreign’ and
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security policies (Özcan, 2002: 17). Even though, under Article 118 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, the NSC is formally an advisory
body to the government, 
in practice it is virtually unheard of for cabinets and parliaments publicly
to question its views, and it is a proud claim made by the NSC secretariat
that there are no examples of recommendations in the realm of foreign 
policy that have remained unimplemented. (Robins, 2003: 76)
The secretariat, traditionally chaired (until October 2004) by a top military
figure, not only undertakes to set the agenda of the NSC meetings but also
coordinates ‘the government’s efforts to implement NSC decisions’ and con-
trols ‘whether decisions proposed by the council are fully implemented on
time’ (Özcan, 2002: 18). 
The other crucial source of the military’s considerable stature in the field of
‘foreign’ affairs is the highly confidential National Security Policy document.
‘Nicknamed the “red booklet”, the document lists the threats to national
security, sets out the priorities, lays out policy guidelines, and provides a
detailed framework of foreign and security policies for governments and
state institutions’ (Özcan, 2002: 20). Updated when deemed necessary, this
document defines not only what internal and external threats are but also
their status (i.e. principal or secondary) within official threat calculations. As
indicated by Özcan (2002: 20), ‘no government can pursue a policy that con-
tradicts the document, which was concluded without any parliamentary
debate, classified as top secret, and retained by the NSC secretariat’.
Briefings delivered by the military to high-ranking bureaucrats, prominent
political figures, academic circles and the media, as well as polemical dis-
cussions with eminent political figures via the press, have been other clear
manifestations of the military’s direct involvement in ‘foreign’ affairs. Even
if these sorts of interventions are becoming increasingly uncommon, the 
military is keeping a close track of such critical ‘foreign’ policy issues as
‘Cyprus, Aegean, Northern Iraq, relations with Israel and NATO’ (Uzgel,
2004: 314). The military is neither ‘the only component of the security estab-
lishment’ (Robins, 2003: 77) nor the only producer of securitizing ‘foreign’
policy discourses in Turkey. Nevertheless, understanding its institutional
weight and autonomy in the process of ‘foreign’ policymaking provides
valuable insights as to how this process itself is cast into the field of security
and bureaucracy. 
Hope for the Future?
If ‘the historical foundations of Turkish state structure’ have really been
shaped ‘between conflicting forces of political liberalization and security’
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(Aydınlı, 2002: 210), as one Turkish IR scholar argues, then Cyprus has
always increased the manoeuvring ability of the latter at the expense of 
the former. In the ‘pendulum swing’ between political normalization and
securitization, Cyprus has served as a trump card in the hands of the securi-
tizers. Furthermore, ‘lack of a meaningful and critical public debate that goes
beyond scientific sounding technicalities’ (Yeldan & Cizre, 2002: 15) has 
hindered the outbreak of genuine alternative arguments and has ultimately
eased the bureaucratization of the Cyprus issue. Hence, the conventional
state rhetoric on the Cyprus question substantially contributed to the insti-
tutionalization of a regime fetishizing such concepts as security, stability and
‘national sensitivities’ in Turkey. This was a regime in which security began
to substitute for politics and was ‘conceived of as synonymous with public
policy, thus granting the military a free entry into policy making’ (Cizre,
2003: 219). 
However, the 1990s were also the years during which ‘pressures for further
democratization continued to well up from within the Turkish society’ (Özel,
2003: 85). While the desecuritization of political issues never took priority in
the agenda of most ordinary Turks, the demands to further civilianize and
liberalize the polity began to be articulated more loudly. Strikingly, the
demands for political liberalization have primarily been articulated owing to
the debates on issues traditionally thought to pertain to the sphere of 
‘foreign’ policy. ‘Foreign’ policy, which was excessively securitized and 
successfully insulated from the public domain, became the area in recent
years where the boundaries demarcating ‘the political’ from ‘the societal’
began to dissolve. Turkey’s strengthening EU vocation in the wake of the
Helsinki Summit of December 1999, where Turkey was granted the status of
a candidate for full membership, and the successive adoption of major 
constitutional and legal amendments by the National Assembly since
August 2001, have become the main thrust behind this process of trans-
formation. 
Although less and less frequently, the chief of the Turkish General Staff is
still making assertive political assessments concerning a wide range of
issues, from domestic politics and Turkey’s bilateral relations with neigh-
bouring countries to the Cyprus issue (Özkök, 2005). However, especially in
the field of ‘foreign’ affairs, such ‘security speak’ has been substantially
downplayed, given a status as simply one of numerous competing dis-
courses in the public realm. Unlike its predecessors, the current government,
for instance, has avoided using a securitized discourse on the Cyprus 
dispute. Notwithstanding the military viewpoint regarding the Annan Plan
as a threat haunting the national interests of both Turkey and Northern
Cyprus, the AKP government vigorously encouraged Cypriot Turks to
endorse the UN’s blueprint in the referendum on 24 April 2004. Moreover,
the EU-led reforms to strengthen the NSC’s civilian component and to
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restructure the setup and responsibilities of its secretariat facilitated, to a 
certain extent, a lessening of the securitizing tone in Turkish ‘foreign’ policy
discourse. 
In tandem with the resurgence of efforts to find a viable solution to the
Cyprus problem within the framework of the Annan Plan, Turkey’s conven-
tional Cyprus policy has moved back into the public arena and has begun to
be criticized more extensively than before. These debates are a relatively
recent yet historically significant political experience for the Turkish society
through which it can relocate itself within the system as a real political sub-
ject vis-à-vis the state. These developments, however, do not imply that
Turkish society has necessarily acquired a more liberal and desecuritized
understanding of ‘foreign’ policy and the Cyprus question than that of the
state. Nevertheless, that Turkish ‘foreign’ policy matters have turned out 
to be part and parcel of public debate has created a chance for political 
mobilization – and hence democratization of state–society relations in
Turkey – that cannot be ignored.
On 17 December 2004, the Council of the European Union, after intense 
bargaining and even a series of diplomatic bluffs, expressed its decision to
open accession negotiations with Turkey by 3 October 2005 (Council of the
European Union, 2004: 6). The Cyprus issue was the only ground for a 
possible diplomatic crisis between Turkey and the EU, avoided by last-
minute efforts. To get membership talks started, Turkey has agreed to sign a
protocol extending its 1963 Association Agreement to the ten new members of
the EU, including the Republic of Cyprus, which it does not de facto 
recognize (Turkish Daily News, 2004a; Council of the European Union, 2004: 6).
The bargaining process itself and the subsequent document demonstrate that
the Cyprus issue will necessarily continue to be the most critical item on the
Turkish–EU agenda. Even if it is difficult to foresee the political consequences
of the increasing EU involvement, it will obviously place the Cyprus issue at
the core of public debate in Turkey. These discussions should at least be
deemed an opportunity for shifting the question from the sphere of security
politics into the boundaries of normal politics. I am convinced that every
attempt to desecuritize – in other words ‘to move issues out from the
threat–defense sequence into the ordinary public sphere’ (Buzan, Wæver &
de Wilde, 1998: 29) – will substantially contribute both to finding a just and
viable solution to the dispute and to the democratic transformation of the
political regime in Turkey. 
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